Language, Philosophy of, Semiotics, Pragmatics & Discourse Analysis, Philosophy - General & Miscellaneous, Semantics
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Overview
Professor Recanati's book is a major new contribution to the philosophy of language. Its point of departure is a refutation of two views central to the work of speech-act theorists such as Austin and Searle: that speech acts are essentially conventional, and that the force of an utterance can be made fully explicit at the level of sentence-meaning and is in principle a matter of linguistic decoding. The author argues that no utterance can be fully understood simply in terms of its linguistic meaning, but that only a contextual inference can provide an adequate framework. In pursuit of this argument, he deals with the major issues of pragmatics and speech-act theory: conversational implicatives and indirect speech acts, the classification of illocutionary forces, the performative/constative distinction, delocutivity, locutionary meaning, non-literal uses of languages, the principle of expressibilty, and the difference between institutional and communicative illocutionary acts.Book Details
Published
January 29, 1988
Publisher
Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Pages
288
Format
Hardcover
ISBN
9780521303538