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Overview
What does it mean to say that this person at this time is 'the same' as that person at an earlier time? If the brain is damaged or the memory lost, how far does a person's identity continue? In this book two eminent philosophers develop very different approaches to the problem.Professor Swinburne presents a dualist view. He criticizes empiricists who confine the discussion to weighing the relative importance of brain continuity, and continuity of memory or character. Personal identity cannot, he claims, be analysed in terms of such observable phenomena. If it can be analysed at all, it is only in terms of sameness of 'soul'.
Professor Shoemaker's account, by contrast, is designed to be compatible with a materialist view of mind. Starting with a simple memory theory, he refines and eventually supplants it with a wider theory of psychological continuity. When this account is developed in the right direction, he argues, it converges with the view of personal identity revealed by a functional account of mind.
The exchange does not end there: in the final part of the book each author is given a chance to rebut the other's argument. The result is a lively debate which illuminates both the substance and the methods of philosophy.
Synopsis
What does it mean to say that this person at this time is 'the same' as that person at an earlier time? If the brain is damaged or the memory lost, how far does a person's identity continue? In this book two eminent philosophers develop very different approaches to the problem.
Professor Swinburne presents a dualist view. He criticizes empiricists who confine the discussion to weighing the relative importance of brain continuity, and continuity of memory or character. Personal identity cannot, he claims, be analysed in terms of such observable phenomena. If it can be analysed at all, it is only in terms of sameness of 'soul'.
Professor Shoemaker's account, by contrast, is designed to be compatible with a materialist view of mind. Starting with a simple memory theory, he refines and eventually supplants it with a wider theory of psychological continuity. When this account is developed in the right direction, he argues, it converges with the view of personal identity revealed by a functional account of mind.
The exchange does not end there: in the final part of the book each author is given a chance to rebut the other's argument. The result is a lively debate which illuminates both the substance and the methods of philosophy.