Another Such Victory

Publishers Weekly

Readers of this cramped assessment of foreign policy during Truman's watch won't learn that the accidental president inherited the Cold War instead, he and his "parochial and nationalistic heritage" apparently bear much of the blame for it. Offner, a professor at Lafayette College, also considers Mao a "populist" despot and deems Stalin obsessed by legitimate national security concerns. Yet after dumping on Truman for his inexperienced, shoot-from-the-hip leadership, Offner reluctantly acknowledges the unprepared president's surprising resolve and capacity. Containment of Soviet ambitions was a "jaundiced" Truman strategy that worked, for example. But in the pre-Cold War chill bequeathed to Truman, even Lend-Lease American aircraft being ferried to Russia in 1941 could not cross into Soviet space with American pilots, a fact the author ignores. And Truman's decisions in Korea, the author argues, would lead his successors to make "extravagant claims of presidential power while leading the nation into conflicts that ultimately diminished the office." Also, Truman's airlift to save West Berlin, his creation of NATO and the economic miracle of the Marshall Plan sowed discord and divided both Germany and Europe in "indefinite stalemate." In scolding Truman for personal diplomacy and for giving in to congressional hawks (as on China), Offner also ignores the constraints that the Republican opposition placed upon him. B&w photos. (Mar.) Copyright 2001 Cahners Business Information.

Library Journal

According to Offner (Victory in Europe 1945: From World War to Cold War), President Truman's Cold War was a time of unprecedented international tension during which Truman himself fanned the flames by attributing international crises in Germany, Greece, China, and Korea solely to the Soviet Union's unrelenting crusade to create Communist satellites throughout Europe and Asia. This scholarly, admirably researched investigation shows Truman to be a narrow-minded leader whose inadequate understanding of history prevented him from viewing the Soviets' actions as attempts to protect their internal security. Offner acknowledges Truman's towering successes: the Marshall Plan, the Berlin Airlift, and the decision to keep civilian control over the atomic bomb. Yet his "us vs. them" mentality prevented him from viewing the civil wars in China and Korea as struggles between indigenous factions. Truman's narrow Cold War ideology, Offner argues, set the stage for American incursion into Vietnam 20 years later. Offner's Truman is not the heroic, increasingly confident president portrayed by David McCullough in his Pulitzer Prize-winning biography, Truman. This excellent revisionist account updates Daniel Yergin's seminal Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (LJ 4/15/77) and is enthusiastically recommended for academic diplomatic history collections. Karl Helicher, Upper Merion Twp. Lib., King of Prussia, PA Copyright 2001 Cahners Business Information.

Booknews

Historian Offner (Lafayette College) takes a contrary position on the legacy of Harry Truman, arguing that his decisions as president forced the U.S. into a long and costly Cold War. Taking its title from the Greeks' empty triumph over the Romans in 280 B.C. (King Pyrrhus remarked: "another such victory, and we are undone"), the book maintains that the U.S. victory over the Communists was a hollow one. After a brief introduction, the narrative begins in April 1945, when Truman succeeded Roosevelt as president. Chapters cover the Potsdam conference, Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Korean War, and Truman's policies on China and Korea. The author argues that Truman's simplistic approach exacerbated the U.S. conflict with China and the Soviet Union. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)