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Overview
The book investigates bargaining between two agents. It presents the history of bargaining analysis from Francis Y. Edgeworth's first formal study, followed by cooperative and noncooperative game-theoretic models, to recent shastic evolutionary investigations. Connections between the results obtained by different methodology are highlighted. The established theory is generalized with respect to its underlying rationality assumptions. Links between usually neglected psychological factors - e.g. the persistence and capriciousness of an agent - and average bargaining success are identified. Applications of bargaining models contribute to the measurement of decision power and to the discussion of distributive justice.
Synopsis
The book investigates bargaining between two agents. It presents the history of bargaining analysis from Francis Y. Edgeworth's first formal study, followed by cooperative and noncooperative game-theoretic models, to recent stochastic evolutionary investigations. Connections between the results obtained by different methodology are highlighted. The established theory is generalized with respect to its underlying rationality assumptions. Links between usually neglected psychological factors - e.g. the persistence and capriciousness of an agent - and average bargaining success are identified. Applications of bargaining models contribute to the measurement of decision power and to the discussion of distributive justice.