From Barnes & Noble
Recent events -- such as the failed Wen Ho Lee espionage case, the discovery of the double agent Robert Hanssen, and the bumbling of the Timothy McVeigh prosecution evidence -- have cast doubts on the performance of the FBI. Here, noted FBI historian Athan Theoharis takes a look at the bureau's questionable conduct during the Cold War years. Why did the FBI have such little success in catching Soviet agents operating on U.S. soil? And why was J. Edgar Hoover more interested in his own personal vendettas than in protecting the country?
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
...[A] valuable addition to the literature on the FBI.
Political Science Quaterly
Theoharis's descriptions and analyses of espionage cases are thorough and fair...
Publishers Weekly
Marquette University historian Theoharis (J. Edgar Hoover, Sex, and Crime), a leading scholar of the FBI, draws deeply on internal documents to argue that often-illegal FBI investigations subverted the agency's mission of combating Communist espionage while providing extensive background information for McCarthy, HUAC and others. Cold War historians have concerned themselves with the FDR and Truman administrations' putative "softness toward Communism," which, Theoharis argues, is unfortunate for two reasons. One, it's not true: the FBI budget skyrocketed from $5 million to $90 million between 1936 and 1952, and Roosevelt's Attorney General Francis Biddle approved all of Hoover's wiretap requests; Hoover himself assured Roosevelt in 1941 that the FBI had Soviet agents "under constant scrutiny." Second, the argument fails to consider the FBI's various failures in capturing and convicting Soviet spies, its use of illegal wiretaps, the transcripts of which would be inadmissible in a trial, and its role in the "creation of a culture of lawlessness." Spies were uncovered by Venona Project codebreakers and the confessions of Elizabeth Bentley, but the FBI failed to build cases even then, argues Theoharis. And when the major COMRAP investigation documented merely "that American Communists were Communists, not Soviet spies," FBI attention shifted from espionage to influence not just in government, but everywhere from Hollywood to Colorado classrooms. Though the title suggests a bracing pace and a revelation-filled read, Theoharis's book is more of a studied analysis that seeks to paint a better portrait of the FBI's crucial hidden role in generating the culture of suspicions and blacklists that dominated McCarthyism. (Apr. 5) Copyright 2002 Cahners Business Information.
Library Journal
We have thrilled to the revelations about Soviet espionage in the United States that have appeared in such recent books as Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev's The Haunted Wood (LJ 11/15/98) and John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr's Venona (LJ 4/15/99). However, author Theoharis, who has spent the past 30 years investigating the activities of J. Edgar Hoover and his FBI (see, for instance, From the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover), insists that we know only a part of the story. Much of the information from both Soviet and American archives has been heavily censored by their respective governments. Reflecting decades of research, Theoharis argues that Hoover's FBI was much more interested in promoting an anti-Communist agenda, which would enhance the credibility of the agency and its political influence, than in countering Soviet espionage. Theoharis presents chilling evidence of illegal FBI wiretapping and other surveillance activities none of which would have withstood legal challenges in its unending effort to identify Communist sympathizers and fellow travelers. From Hollywood actors to Martin Luther King Jr. to political opponents of Washington politicians the FBI considered them all potential enemies of the state. Theoharis's book is an outstanding contribution to the growing historical literature on the Cold War and a potent warning to anyone who thinks we have heard the last word on the Cold War we haven't. Heartily recommended for all collections. Ed Goedeken, Iowa State Univ. Lib. Copyright 2001 Cahners Business Information.
Booknews
Basing his work on careful research of FBI files, Theoharis' (history, Marquette U.) reveals the role of the FBI in the most important espionage of the Cold War years. He raises a number of new questions about their operations in the past, and concerns for present-day policymakers. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
Kirkus Reviews
The author of J. Edgar Hoover, Sex, and Crime (1995) turns his attention here to the FBI chief's political attitudes, making him look like Don Quixote: correct somehow, but ultimately chasing windmills. Theoharis (History/Marquette Univ.) argues that although Hoover was incompetent when it came to catching Soviet spies, his paranoia about the communist threat to America in the middle of the 20th century was valid. There were many Soviet agents operating in the US under Hoover's watch, the author suggests; Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, who initially reined him in, weren't eager to start a Red Scare, but they also underestimated the power of spies working in the federal government. Hoover managed to catch wind of espionage through a variety of means, especially the Venona Project, a code-breaking operation that gave the US access to communications between Moscow and its agents. (Theoharis relies on redacted transcripts from the project and recently released KGB records for much of his documentation.) The bureau failed to fully exploit the project's findings, however, often dithering until real breaks came along. Theoharis argues that the FBI might never have learned of many spies if crucial Soviet operatives hadn't defected and handed over intelligence information on a silver platter. Moreover, even when the FBI caught the culprits, it often failed to convict them in court because the bureau tended to uncover its information via illegal wiretaps and break-ins. The Rosenbergs were an unusual case: the bureau was able to prosecute them on espionage charges because their co-conspirators testified against them. That these co-conspirators had confessed after being presented with illegallyobtained information went conveniently unmentioned in court. Hoover demonstrated that little hard evidence was necessary in the pursuit of domestic communism. The stage was set for a senator from Wisconsin. A fine debunking of the expertise of law enforcement authorities.
