Publishers Weekly
The 20th-century presidency can be defined by its growing accretion of power, argues Graubard, longtime Daedalus editor and Brown University historian emeritus. America's then controversial, presidentially led interventions in WWI and WWII required new extensions of the office's powers; the Cold War era of "permanent" Soviet threat and Vietnam-related secrecy amplified them; and Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, he says, added spin and deception to the mix. George W. Bush thus assumed an office whose powers are exponentially greater than anything envisioned by the Founding Fathers, subject to correspondingly limited checks and balances. The result, according to Graubard, is a White House increasingly sealed off from the public its occupant ostensibly serves. In acerbic, elegantly written critiques of successive administrations, he depicts presidencies that are increasingly responsive primarily to their particular internal dynamic. The chapter on Clinton (titled "The Rake's Progress") is a particularly effective analysis of a chief executive who "looked for new maps but never found them." George W. Bush is characterized as a poseur whose combination of hubris and ignorance may have done lasting damage to the U.S. at home and abroad. While readers may challenge his interpretations, Graubard's America, transformed by the "kings, courtiers, and warriors" of its 20th-century executive branch, merits wide and careful attention. Author tour. (Nov. 2) Copyright 2004 Reed Business Information.
Library Journal
Graubard (American history, emeritus, Brown Univ.), the longtime editor of Daedalus, has written a sweeping, critical account of the development of the modern presidency that is comparable to Arthur M. Schlesinger's The Imperial Presidency (1973). While Schlesinger examined the harmful effects of the expansion of presidential power from 1789, Graubard limits his study to a group of 18 presidents (from Teddy Roosevelt to George W. Bush) whom he defines as 20th-century presidents. He goes on to argue that the presidency of the 18th and 19th centuries was transformed by two factors: hot and cold wars and the weapons and intelligence necessary to fight them, as well as the expanded significance of foreign affairs. Each contributed to the growth of presidential power as the political and moral restraints that held the presidency in check eroded. As the demands of a highly complex, international arena intensified, the increasingly "ordinary men" who occupied the White House (the lone exception being FDR) lacked the vision, character, and/or expertise to meet the challenges to national security without engaging in questionable or morally ambiguous tactics that extended the powers of the presidency. Graubard's historical analysis is thorough and his concluding discussion of Tocquville and Bryce fascinating. This important work deserves a wide audience; recommended for all libraries.-Thomas J. Baldino, Wilkes Univ., Wilkes-Barre, PA Copyright 2004 Reed Business Information.
Kirkus Reviews
Do presidents control the government, or does the government control presidents?In the old days, it was supposed, America's leaders were men of the people, representing the people, interested in the welfare of the people; as if by design, they were ipso facto morally superior to the crowned kings and queens of the old country (though, of course, Sydney Smith's query of 1820 still holds: "Under which of the old tyrannical governments of Europe is every sixth man a slave?"). But by the end of the 20th century, writes Graubard (History Emeritus/Brown Univ.; Mr. Bush's War, 1992, etc.), things had changed; for a century, America's rulers "were monarchs, admittedly of a new breed, increasingly attended by courtiers" and given to waging war constantly, all over the world, in order to maintain the Empire. It's a lively and promising conceit, but Graubard undermines it by starting off with the essentially decent Theodore Roosevelt, who showed admirable restraint while glowering and talking of big sticks: " . . . whatever his admiration for military and naval power," says Graubard, "they never led him into foreign wars." His thesis is worn away, too, by all the nagging questions the reader is likely to form along what is, after all, a very long way: Was H.R. Haldeman really more of a courtier than Alexander Hamilton? Was Jimmy Carter really as bad as all that? (Yes, Graubard answers, he really was. But Al Haig was even worse.) What's more terrible, getting caught in a lie or getting caught in a blunder? And so on. Still, Graubard's portraits of 20th-century presidents are useful in a college-survey sort of way, and they lead him to a quite wonderful fire-and-brimstone denunciation of the currentadministration, which is all about power, secrecy, and deception, staffed by "men and women, courtiers and mock warriors, [who] served a monarch whose authority rested on a contested election, who acted as if the nation had invested him with exceptional powers."Imperfect, then, but quite interesting: much like some of those very presidents.
