Books.org participates in affiliate programs including Bookshop.org and the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program. We may earn a commission from qualifying purchases made through links on this page, at no additional cost to you.
Overview
The modern theory of threats in bargaining situations is presented in a unified and systematic treatment that puts the existing literature in a new perspective. Harold Houba and Wilko Bolt provide a masterful synthesis of the fundamental results obtained in the rapidly expanding game-theoretic literature. The relative impacts of the fundamental forces on the bargaining outcome are discussed and related to the visions expressed by Nobel-laureate John Nash. Many topics -such as robustness of the results with respect to the diversity of known bargaining procedures, the role of commitment and policy bargaining situations- receive their most extensive treatment to date.
Credible Threats in Negotiations is suitable as a textbook for graduate students in economic theory and other social sciences and a necessity as a resource for scholars interested in bargaining situations.
Synopsis
Houba (world food studies, Vrije U., Amsterdam) and Bolt (De Nederlandsche Bank) survey some of the major developments in the field of strategic bargaining models, emphasizing the role of threats in the negotiation process. Announcing a strike during wage bargaining, or announcing a trade war during trade talks are among the examples they cite as threats, or actions outside the negotiation that negotiators have at their disposal. They begin by describing situations in which neither side has threats at hand, then look at various kinds of threats that can be used, and how they change the strategies on both sides of the table. Annotation (c)2003 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR