Deontic Morality and Control

This book addresses the following dilemma: if determinism is true, no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong, for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. This dilemma can be evaded, because moral obligation is incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. Prof. Haji concludes by explaining that if no action is morally obligatory, right, or wrong, then our world would be morally impoverished.

This book analyses whether determinism or indeterminism is compatible with moral obligation, right or wrong.

Booknews

Haji (philosophy, U. of Minnesota, Morris) sets forth a detailed presentation of a new dilemma about freedom and deontic morality which closely mirrors the long-existing dilemma of freedom and responsibility: If determinism and indeterminism are true, then no one has control over one's actions, but it is morally obligatory, right or wrong, to perform an action only if one has control over it, and therefore no one ever performs an action that is morally obligatory, right or wrong. Haji suggests a way that the dilemma can be evaded, arguing that moral obligation is incompatible with determinism but not indeterminism, and that if determinism were true the result would be a morally-impoverished world. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)