Expanded Social Scientist's Bestiary

The (Expanded)Social Scientist’s Bestiary addresses a number of important theoretical and philosophical issues in the social sciences from the perspective of contemporary philosophy of science. The book discusses and critiques the various arguments that purport to establish that it is a mistake to believe that a naturalistic social science- i.e. social science that in some way resembles the natural sciences- can be produced. It is intended to guide social scientists-researchers, teachers, and students-so that they will not fall victim to the beasts they will encounter in the course of their inquiries. Such beasts include holism, post-positivistic work in the philosophy of science, Kuhnian relativism, the denial of objectivity and value neutrality, hermeneutics and several others, both good and bad. This expanded and revised edition contains four new chapters tackling such contemporary beasts as Popperian rules, narrative research, and various forms of constructivism. The chapters presented in this volume are, as far as possible, self-contained so that each chapter can be consulted without the necessity of having read the others, thus making this volume an invaluable guide for faculty members and graduate students in the whole of the social sciences and related applied fields.

The (Expanded) Social Scientist's Bestiary addresses a number of important theoretical and philosophical issues in the social sciences from the perspective of contemporary philosophy of science. This expanded and revised edition contains four new chapters tackling such contemporary beasts as Popperian rules, narrative research, and various forms of constructivism. The chapters presented in this volume are, as far as possible, self-contained so that each chapter can be consulted without the necessity of having read the others, thus making this volume an invaluable guide for faculty members and graduate students in the whole of the social sciences and related applied fields.

Booknews

There has been much skepticism about the possibility of producing a naturalistic social science that is structurally or methodologically similar to the natural sciences. Phillips (education and philosophy, Stanford University) contends that these skeptical arguments are flawed, and argues in defense of the possibility of producing a naturalistic social science. He examines narrative research and social constructionism, and offers a neo-Popperian account of falsificationism. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

D. C. Phillips is professor of education and philosophy and associate dean for academic affairs in the School of Education at Stanford University.