From Yalta to Berlin

Publishers Weekly - Publisher's Weekly

From WWII meetings at Casablanca, Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam to the far-flung shuttle diplomacy that brought about German unification, Smyser (The German Economy, etc.) provides a masterful account of diplomatic detail that deserves broad recognition and acclaim. Anything but a dry history, it reflects the high stakes, uncertain distribution of forces and hidden landscapes of risk that forged the Cold War era, dominated by centuries-old concerns for security, self-determination and national honor among all the contending powers. The copious details concern nuances of maneuver, positioning and interpretation that make for compelling drama. Drawing on a full range of sources--from diplomatic records, to personal recollections and his own interviews--Smyser provides an authoritative, remarkably engaging account. Its two weaknesses are the absence of any discussion of the persistence and resurgence of fascism in Germany, and an insider's insularity of focus and outlook. Smyser faithfully notes how leading figures who kept Berliners' (and all Germans') hopes alive--General Lucius Clay during the Berlin airlift, JFK with his "Ich bin ein Berliner" speech, Willy Brandt with his Ost-Politik--did so because their vision and instinct transcended the parameters of normal diplomatic thinking. Nevertheless, in the quality of its prose and the depth of its excavations into diplomatic and political activity, this is a valuable and exciting contribution. Maps, photos. Additional text on Kosovo not seen by PW. (Aug.) Copyright 1999 Cahners Business Information.

Library Journal

Smyser (The German Economy) sees Germany as the vortex of the Cold War, the most important consideration not only in European politics but in international relations generally for the last 45 years. Even seemingly remote issues such as the Cuban missile crisis are discussed in terms of the German question. Smyser spent many years working on German affairs in the State and Defense departments and has written extensively on the topic. This new title is based on both his work experience and his research in newly opened archives in the former East Germany and the former Soviet Union. He has reconstructed in meticulous detail the negotiations and posturings of the involved powers, attributing more mistakes to the Soviet Union than to the West. He ends with the reunification of Germany, on the optimistic note that the Germany of the 1990s is stronger and better positioned than at any time since Bismarck. Specialists will welcome this thorough and detailed analysis.--Marcia L. Sprules, Council on Foreign Relations Lib., New York Copyright 1999 Cahners Business Information.

Booknews

Focusing on the personalities who controlled Germany's fate<-->FDR, Churchill, Stalin, De Gaulle, Adenauer, Kennedy, Brandt, Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev, Kohl and others<-->this book chronicles the story of how Germany was divided and re-united, using the German Question to illustrate the difficulties and opportunities of diplomacy in our age. Smyser has written several books on German-American relations and a landmark work on the German economy. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Kirkus Reviews

Smyser (The German Economy, not reviewed) shows eloquently how much the history of the world was shaped by the Cold War struggle over Germany. Much of this story will be familiar, but much will be new, even to close analysts of the period. The Berlin Airlift to defeat the Russian blockade of Berlin in 1948 has been seen, quite rightly, as one of the triumphs of Western policy. But Truman's decision to assign further aircraft to ensure its success came over the opposition of both the State Department and the Department of Defense. The early suspicions of West Germany by the US, Britain, and France have also been well documented, but they were matched by the Soviet suspicion of East Germany and of its leader, Walter Ulbricht. Historians have noted the ineptitude of Soviet foreign minister Molotov's diplomacy and its role in creating NATO, but Soviet president Andrey Gromyko was equally inept in rejecting various early initiatives by President Kennedy that would have seriously undercut the Western position in Germany. It was a beginning, writes Smyser, "more like Neville Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler in 1938 than like the spirit of King Arthur and the Knights of Camelot." Kennedy's famous speech in West Berlin was initially a cautious one, and was rewritten by him on the way from the airport and under the influence of the tumultuous crowds that had turned out to cheer him. Perhaps the greatest revelation is the role played by Yuri Andropov, then head of the KGB, in encouraging Willi Brandt's Ostpolitik, which included giving Helmut Schmidt, Brandt's successor as chancellor, advance knowledge of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Equally interesting is the role played by retired EastGerman spymaster Marcus Wolf in telling the Soviets just how badly in debt the East Germans actually were. Smyser's account clearly substantiates Brandt's conviction that détente would help erode the Soviet empire. A thoughtful, cogent, and incisive account of a critical period.