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Overview
Why do groups of talented and experienced individuals make disastrously bad collective judgments, such as the Kennedy administration's flawed decision to proceed with the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961? In his pioneering research on collective decision making, Irving Janis introduced the concept of "groupthink"—a deliberately Orwellian neologism—to describe such occurrences. Now, in the first book-length study of groupthink since Janis's work, Paul 't Hart has provided a rigorous and systematic version of this influential theory which opens several new avenues for research.
Synopsis
Why do groups of talented and experienced individuals make disastrously bad collective judgments, such as the Kennedy administration's flawed decision to proceed with the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961? In his pioneering research on collective decision making, Irving Janis introduced the concept of "groupthink" — a deliberately Orwellian neologism — to describe such occurrences. Now, in the first book-length study of groupthink since Janis's work, Paul 't Hart has provided a rigorous and systematic version of this influential theory which opens several new avenues for research.
Booknews
't Hart provides a systematic version of Irving Janis' influential theory, opening several new avenues for research and examining the circumstances most likely to produce or counteract groupthink. He applies the theory to issues such as leadership style, risk taking, accountability, and prevention. His case study of the Iran-Contra scandal demonstrates the continuing relevance of groupthink theory in the analysis of flawed decision making. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)