Overview
Interest in congressional oversight of intelligence has risen again in the 110th Congress, in part because of the House Democratic majority's pledge to enact the remaining recommendations from the U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission. Its 2004 conclusions set the stage for reconsideration of the problems affecting Congress' structure in this area. The commission's unanimous report, as detailed in this book, covers many issues, and concludes that congressional oversight of intelligence was "dysfunctional". This book proposes two distinct solutions:(1) creation of a joint committee on intelligence (JCI), modeled after the defunct Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), or (2) enhanced status and power for the existing select committees on intelligence, by making them standing committees and granting both authorization and appropriations power.
Synopsis
Interest in congressional oversight of intelligence has risen again in the 110th Congress, in part because of the House Democratic majority's pledge to enact the remaining recommendations from the U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission. Its 2004 conclusions set the stage for reconsideration of the problems affecting Congress' structure in this area. The commission's unanimous report, as detailed in this book, covers many issues, and concludes that congressional oversight of intelligence was "dysfunctional". This book proposes two distinct solutions:(1) creation of a joint committee on intelligence (JCI), modeled after the defunct Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), or (2) enhanced status and power for the existing select committees on intelligence, by making them standing committees and granting both authorization and appropriations power.