Vietnam War - United States - Political Aspects, Vietnam War - General & Miscellaneous, U.S. Politics & Government - 1968-1977, U.S. Politics & Government - 1945 - 1989, Presidents of the United States - Biography, 20th Century American History - Vietnam
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Overview
In this major study, a noted expert on the Vietnam War objectively examines how and why President Lyndon Johnson and his administration conducted the war as they did. Drawing on a wealth of newly released documents from the LBJ Library, George Herring discusses the concept of limited war and how it affected President Johnson's decision making, Johnson's relations with his military commanders, the administration's pacification program of 1965-1967, the management of public opinion, and the 'fighting while negotiating' strategy pursued after the Tet Offensive in 1968.Editorials
Publishers Weekly -
In this compelling analysis of President Lyndon Johnson's management of the war in Vietnam, Herring ( America's Longest War ) proposes that LBJ's style of leadership adversely affected the war's outcome. Characterizing Johnson as ``a flamboyant and impulsive man in a situation that demanded restraint,'' Herring suggests that the president's obsessive secrecy, his urge to control everything and his craving for approval contributed to the failure of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. He maintains that Johnson discouraged the open exchange of ideas in discussions with advisers and failed to encourage cooperation or coordination among those directing the war effort. The air war against the North, for instance, operated separately from the ground war in the South, and the air war in Laos was separate from both. LBJ's most grievous failure, according to Herring, was his neglecting to give strategic guidelines to military and civilian representatives running the operations and pacification programs in the field. Impressively argued, this study constitutes a solid addition to our understanding of the Vietnam War and a president. (June)Library Journal
Herring, a professor of history at the University of Kentucky and the author of numerous books on war and diplomacy (e.g., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, LJ 7/83), contributes the 11th book to this series on the Johnson presidency. The author critiques Johnson's management of the Vietnam War in terms of military strategy, diplomacy, and domestic public opinion, arguing that LBJ's management style was framed by his commitment to fighting a limited war and his inability when setting policy to side with either the hawks or the doves within his administration. Presenting LJB's major policy initiatives from their formulation through implementation, Herring shows that in each instance, the administration's flawed management failed to meet the challenges encountered. This concise, well-researched account offers a unique perspective on previously studied events, making this volume a valued addition to undergraduate and graduate collections. Recommended.-Robert Favini, Bentley Coll. Lib., Waltham, Mass.Book Details
Published
December 1, 1994
Publisher
Austin : University of Texas Press, 1994.
Pages
244
Format
Hardcover
ISBN
9780292730854