Overview
While studies of the Civil War generally credit Robert E. Lee with military expertise, historian Bevin Alexander argues that Stonewall Jackson was a superior strategist who could have won the war for the South: Had Lee accepted Jackson's plan for an invasion of the North, the South might have surprised and dismayed the Union forces into defeat. Using primary sources, Bevin Alexander reconstructs the battles that demonstrate Jackson's brilliance as a commander, including Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville, where he tragically met his demise. Detailed maps accompany this controversial account of a pivotal moment in American history.Synopsis
A former combat historian, Alexander has written several military histories. Originally published in hardcover in 1992 (Henry Holt and Company), his account of Stonewall Jackson appears reprinted here in paperback for the first time. Alexander questions the assumption that Robert E. Lee was a brilliant general who achieved all that was possible against superior forces. Through analysis of battles that took place in Virginia and Maryland from 1861-63, he concludes that Jackson possessed the strategic vision necessary to win key battles and campaigns but was blocked in his efforts by Lee, and that it was Lee's destructive strategies that led to the Union's victory. Annotation ©2004 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
Publishers Weekly
Alexander ( Korea: The First War We Lost ) debuts as a Civil War historian by asserting that Stonewall Jackson, rather than Robert E. Lee, possessed the strategic insight that might have won Confederate independence. Jackson initially advocated striking at the Union's will by invading the North; when neither Lee nor Jefferson Davis accepted this concept, Jackson concentrated on plans to destroy the Union army. Here too he was repeatedly frustrated, according to Alexander, by Lee's limited strategic insight and tendency to accept pitched battles whose losses the Confederacy could not afford. Only at Chancellorsville in 1863 did Lee accede to Jackson's bold plan, which might have annihilated the Army of the Potomac had Jackson not been mortally wounded. Alexander's critique of Lee, and his belief that decisive battles were possible under Civil War conditions, are debatable. Nevertheless this revisionist analysis merits the attention of Civil War students. (Nov.)