Overview
For many, Douglas MacArthur was a general to be ranked with Grant and Lee; for others he was much bluster and some cowardice, the "Dugout Doug" who abandoned his troops at Corregidor. The truth, according to military historian Richard Connaughton, lies somewhere in the middle. MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines is a judicious and hard-headed portrait of a courageous general and deeply flawed man.Douglas MacArthur was born into a military family in 1880, and the need to measure up to the heroic example set by his father would be the driving force behind MacArthur's career. But MacArthur's best qualities would forever be undone by his arrogance, vanity, deviousness, and a truly breathtaking capacity for making enemies -- F.D.R. chief among them -- so that when MacArthur arrived in the Philippines in the mid-30s it was as an exile from Roosevelt's anger.
The Philippines were something of a family business for the MacArthur clan (his father had distinguished himself there at the turn of the century), and MacArthur's attitude toward the pre-war situation smacked of the military equivalent of papal infallibility. Against all the odds, he assured both Washington and the Philippine government of the islands' security in the case of a Japanese attack, and he consistently underestimated Japanese militarism and overestimated the strength and readiness of the Philippine army. In holding these views, Connaughton argues, MacArthur was proceeding on a notion as much fueled by romance as military good sense. Willfully blind to the impending crisis, and brashly confident of his own powers, the Philippines and MacArthur's troops were vulnerable to attack when it finally came in late December of 1941.
MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines is a fascinating study of Douglas MacArthur and the crisis of leadership, as well as a focused study of one of the pivotal moments in World War II.
Synopsis
For many, Douglas MacArthur was a general to be ranked with Grant and Lee; for others he was much bluster and some cowardice, the "Dugout Doug" who abandoned his troops at Corregidor. The truth, according to military historian Richard Connaughton, lies somewhere in the middle. MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines is a judicious and hard-headed portrait of a courageous general and deeply flawed man.
Douglas MacArthur was born into a military family in 1880, and the need to measure up to the heroic example set by his father would be the driving force behind MacArthur's career. But MacArthur's best qualities would forever be undone by his arrogance, vanity, deviousness, and a truly breathtaking capacity for making enemies -- F.D.R. chief among them -- so that when MacArthur arrived in the Philippines in the mid-30s it was as an exile from Roosevelt's anger.
The Philippines were something of a family business for the MacArthur clan (his father had distinguished himself there at the turn of the century), and MacArthur's attitude toward the pre-war situation smacked of the military equivalent of papal infallibility. Against all the odds, he assured both Washington and the Philippine government of the islands' security in the case of a Japanese attack, and he consistently underestimated Japanese militarism and overestimated the strength and readiness of the Philippine army. In holding these views, Connaughton argues, MacArthur was proceeding on a notion as much fueled by romance as military good sense. Willfully blind to the impending crisis, and brashly confident of his own powers, the Philippines and MacArthur's troops were vulnerable to attack when it finally came in late December of 1941.
MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines is a fascinating study of Douglas MacArthur and the crisis of leadership, as well as a focused study of one of the pivotal moments in World War II.
Library Journal
The loss of the Philippines to Japanese invaders in the first half of 1942 was the largest defeat ever suffered by American forces. The lack of supplies, regular troops, and equipment was a very serious factor, but all blame cannot rest there. The Japanese would still have been successful owing to their air and naval superiority, but the beleaguered defenders could have held out longer had they been better prepared. Troop training, deployment, and logistical preparations all proved inadequate when tested by combat, and the blame, according to military historian Connaughton (The Battle for Manila), must rest squarely on General Douglas MacArthur. Connaughton argues that he was insecure, egotistical, oblivious to weaknesses of his forces, and overconfident of possible help from the States. MacArthur was protected from blame owing to his potential to cause political trouble for President Roosevelt, the fact that America needed a hero figure at that time, and his ability to inspire people. This book is well-researched, but Connaughton overstates his case; the reader is not persuaded that MacArthur "lost" the Philippines, though clearly he could have made better decisions. Suitable for public and academic libraries. (Illustrations and maps not seen.) Daniel K. Blewett, Coll. of DuPage Lib., Glen Ellyn, IL Copyright 2001 Cahners Business Information.