Managing "Command and Control" in the Persian Gulf War

During Desert Shield, the Air Force built a very complicated organizational architecture to control large numbers of air sorties. During the air campaign itself, officers at each level of the Central Command Air Forces believed they were managing the chaos of war. Yet, when the activities of the many significant participants are pieced together, it appears that neither the planners nor Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, the Joint Force Air Component Commander, knew the details of what was happening in the air campaign or how well the campaign was going. There was little appreciation of the implications of complex organizational architectures for military command and control. Against a smarter and more aggressive foe, the system may well have failed.

The system for command and control in the Gulf War was too complicated and inadequate. We were lucky.

Booknews

The results of a team created by the Secretary of the Air Force to collect, integrate, and evaluate information about Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Examines the need to respond to a situation against the need to maintain a structure within which information can be organized and analyzed so that decisions can be made and quickly communicated (hence the phrase "managed chaos"). Discusses the special planning group known as "The Black Hole," the tactical air control center and the guidance, apportionment, and targeting group, bomb damage assessment, and a view of Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner as the First Joint Force Air Component Commander. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.

MARK D. MANDELES is President of the J. de Bloch Group.

THOMAS C. HONE is a member of the faculty of the George C. Marshall Center.

SANFORD S. TERRY is Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force.