Books.org participates in affiliate programs including Bookshop.org and the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program. We may earn a commission from qualifying purchases made through links on this page, at no additional cost to you.
Overview
This is the first comprehensive study based on a detailed textual analysis of the classical works on war by Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung, and to a lesser extent, Jomini and Machiavelli. Brushing stereotypes aside, the author takes a fresh look at what these strategic thinkers actually said—not what they are widely believed to have said. He finds that despite their apparent differences in terms of time, place, cultural background, and level of material/technological development, all had much more in common than previously supposed. In fact, the central conclusion of this book is that the logic of waging war and of strategic thinking is as universal and timeless as human nature itself.
This third, revised and expanded edition includes five new chapters and some new charts and diagrams.
Synopsis
This study is based on a detailed textual analysis of the classical works on war by Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung and, to a lesser extent, by Jomini and Machiavelli. The central conclusion is that the logic of waging war and of strategic thinking is as universal and timeless as human nature itself.
This third revised and expanded edition contains five new chapters. One of these concerns Clausewitz' insights into the problem of war termination. Another is dedicated to the importance of correctly identifying the nature of war. The author has also added a chapter on Corbett's naval strategy, the relation of his work to the spirit of that of Sun Tzu, and in particular the issue of limited war and war by limited contingency.
Booknews
Based on textual analysis of the works of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung, Jomini, and Machiavelli, this study seeks out the essential, timeless elements of waging war and thinking strategically. The comparative analysis highlights the continuity in the logic of war throughout history, with attention to its political roots, its rational purpose, and the factors influencing its direction and outcome. This third edition includes five new chapters, as well as new charts and diagrams. These chapters discuss the political results of victory, Clausewitz's "Trinitarian Analysis," and Corbett's naval strategy. Handel teaches strategy at the U.S. Naval War College. Distributed by ISBS. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)