NATO's Empty Victory : A Postmortem on the Balkan War

Library Journal

Within days of the end of the fighting, policy-oriented scholars began writing up the lessons and meaning of the Kosovo conflict (March-June 1999). The arguments assembled in this collection probe deeper into the diplomatic and moral rationale for the NATO-led conflict with Serbia. Readers familiar with the CATO Institute, an independent Washington think-tank, will find that this text adopts its generally conservative line. A battery of foreign policy experts focus on what they perceive to have been the diplomatic miscalculations and the moral blunders in the lopsided, ill-advised conflict. These range from NATO's misreading of Serb and Albanian nationalism to the harming of the West's relations with Russia and China. John Mearsheimer's essay on partition as the only rational solution to the Serb-Kosovar problem, in particular, introduces a much-needed element of sober realism into the debate about the future of the Balkans. While these essays do not cover important recent events, they underscore the need for a sustained effort to overcome the weight of Balkan history in reviewing the recent conflict. For academic and larger public libraries.--John Raymond Walser, U.S. Dept. of State, Washington, DC Copyright 2000 Cahners Business Information.

Booknews

Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, and nine other (primarily conservative) foreign policy scholars, evaluate the war in Yugoslavia, emphasizing the costs, such as loss of life, and the economic, social, and political tensions that were exacerbated by the war. Three chapters examine whether or not the conflict could have been averted, and others criticize the United States' and NATO's apparent disregard for the rule of law. The book concludes with several recommendations for the future, both in the Balkans, including partitioning Kosovo, and for NATO as an institution. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)