Peace Operations And Intrastate Conflict

Based upon consideration of United Nation missions to the Congo (1960-64), Somalia (1992-95), and the former Yugoslavia (1992-95) and examination of counterinsurgency campaigns, Mockaitis develops a new model for intervening in intrastate conflicts and commends the British approach to civil strife as the basis for a new approach to peace operations. Both contemporary and historic examples demonstrate that military intervention to end civil conflict differs radically from traditional peacekeeping. Ending a civil war requires the selective and limited use of force to stop the fighting, safeguard humanitarian aid work, and restore law and order. Since intrastate conflict resembles insurgency far more than it does any other type of war, counterinsurgency principles should form the basis of a new intervention model.

A comprehensive approach to resolve intrastate conflict requires that peace forces, NGOs, and local authorities cooperate in rebuilding a war-torn country. Only the British have enjoyed much success in counterinsurgency campaigns. Starting from the three broad principles of minimum force, civil-military cooperation, and flexibility, the British approach in responding to insurgency has combined the limited use of force with political and civil development. Carefully considered and correctly applied, these principles could produce a more effective model for peace operations to end intrastate conflict.

Based upon consideration of United Nation missions to the Congo, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia and examination of counterinsurgency campaigns, Mockaitis develops a new model for intervening in intrastate conflicts and commends the British approach to civil strife as the basis for a new approach to peace operations.

THOMAS R. MOCKAITIS is Professor of History and Chair of the History Department at DePaul University.