Jurisprudence, Sociology - General & Miscellaneous, Professional Responsibility & Legal Ethics, Ethics & Moral Philosophy - Theoretical, 19th Century German Philosophy, 18th Century German Philosophy - Kant
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Overview
In Practices and Principles, Mark Tunick takes up the debate between universalists and relativists, and, in political philosophy, between communitarians and liberals, each of which has roots in an earlier debate between Kant and Hegel. Tunick focuses on three case studies: promises, contract law, and the Fourth Amendment issue of privacy. In his analysis, he rejects both uncritical deference to social practice and draconian adherence to principles when making legal and ethical judgments. He argues that we do not always need to choose between abstract principles and social practices. Sometimes we appeal to both; sometimes we need to appeal to shared social norms; and sometimes, where there is no ethical community, we can only appeal to principles. Ultimately, he rejects simplified arguments that force us to choose between either practices or principles, universalism or relativism, and liberalism or communitarianism.Editorials
Library Journal
Tunick, well known as a specialist on Hegel (Hegel's Political Philosophy, Princeton Univ., 1992), puts his expertise to good use in this work, addressing the question of how such social practices should count in ethical and legal questions. In response, he usefully contrasts the views of Kant, who stressed universal principles, with Hegel, for whom local circumstance stood foremost. Tunick by no means confines his interest in the topic to historical matters. He discusses the role of social practice in issues of promises, contract law, and privacy. The author's own position avoids exclusive stress on either principles or practice. His striking and original discussion merits wide attention.David Gordon, Bowling Green State Univ., OHEthics
The central question in this lucid and thoughtful book is, what force do the existence of practices, customs, and traditions have when we make legal and ethical judgments? Tunick's answer is that as much as we need principles to criticize our practices, practices still matter for legal and ethical judgement.New York Law Journal
Practical and beneficial as a reference for research. As a whole, anyone with strong affection for the area of philosophy will likely enjoy the style and substance offered in Practices and Principles.Choice
Tunick . . . does a fine job of arguing against those approaches that reify absolute principles and those that rely solely on the justifying power of agreed-upon social practice. . . . The truth, asserts Tunick, lies somewhere in between, in the unresolvable tension that arises when practice and principle collide and transform each other. . . . [Tunick's] writing style is clear and relatively jargon-free. . . . Recommended.Book Details
Published
April 8, 1998
Publisher
Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c1998.
Pages
256
Format
Hardcover
ISBN
9780691015606