Overview
In its 9/11 report, the Kean Commission criticized U.S. intelligence for having failed to anticipate the terrorist attacks, basing its findings on the premise of absolute security. But, says Athan Theoharis, absolute security is an illusory quest. His compelling analysis traces the troubled history of relations among American intelligence agencies. By expanding the authority of the agencies and indeed calling for administrative reforms to ensure greater cooperation and coordination among them, these unilateral efforts, particularly by the CIA and FBI, have led not to enhanced security but to abuses of power and violations of individual liberties.
Synopsis
In its 2004 report on 9/11, the Kean Commission criticized U.S. intelligence for having failed to anticipate the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Basing its findings on the premise of absolute security, the commission faulted the FBI for not adopting a creative and aggressive approach to the terrorist threat, and both the FBI and the CIA for their inadequate cooperation. But, says distinguished historian Athan Theoharis in his new book, absolute security is an illusory quest that is certain to nurture disappointment-and worse. His compelling analysis traces the troubled history of relations among American intelligence agencies and points out the historical myopia that characterizes the Kean Commission's findings and recommendations.
Political Science Quarterly
Provides expert history as an important context for understanding the lead-up to current debates and controversies on how to organize, operate, and protect homeland security in the wake of September 11.