Synopsis
The diversion to military programmes of materials and technologies obtained from foreign suppliers for peaceful purposes has played a prominent role in the known cases of nuclear proliferation. The need to strengthen nuclear export controls has been identified by the G8 group of industrialized states and the European Union. This study examines the structure and activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as an ad hoc group of 44 states committed to applying effective controls on the export of nuclear-related dual-use equipment and material.
In this context, the study raises the questions of what kinds of nuclear activity are consistent with the obligations of states parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It examines the relationship and contradictions between Article IV of the NPT, which gives non-nuclear weapon states parties an 'inalienable right' to nuclear materials and technology for peaceful uses, and the rules and guidelines agreed by the NSG, which are intended to block access to nuclear material and technologies for military use. The study considers how theses guidelines are interpreted in two specific cases: Iran and India. It examines the potential impact on decision making within the NSG of the tendency to divide the world into categories based on 'good' and 'bad' behaviour using political criteria rather than the record of each recipient vis-à-vis the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The study also discusses whether and to what extent other current processes and instruments intended to prevent nuclear proliferation—specifically the Proliferation Security Initiative and the activities of the IAE and the UN '1540' Committee—can supplement export control decision making, or even supplant the role of the NSG.