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Synopsis
This book examines the development of Soviet thinking on the operational employment of their Air Force from 1918 to 1945, using Soviet theoretical writings and Soviet analyses of combat actions written in the period examined. Soviet theory did not form a monolithic bloc of opinion, nor was it copied wholesale from abroad, but instead was formed in a process of debates founded on fundamentally Soviet concerns about the nature of potential wars, and on Soviet views of combats as they occurred. Equally, Soviet theory before World War II was neither wholly prescient, nor utterly flawed. However, Soviet utilization of their theory was crippled in the later 1930s and the early stages of World War II by problems with dissemination of lessons learned and training of air crew and officers. As these problems were overcome, the Soviet Air Force became an increasingly powerful weapon for carrying out the ground force support missions that Soviet theory determined was paramount.