Join Books.org — it's free

Presidents of the United States - General & Miscellaneous, U.S. Politics & Government - General & Miscellaneous
The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic by Eric A. Posner β€” book cover

The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic

by Eric A. Posner, Adrian Vermeule
Available on Bookshop Write a review

Books.org participates in affiliate programs including Bookshop.org and the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program. We may earn a commission from qualifying purchases made through links on this page, at no additional cost to you.

Log in to track your reading progress.

Overview

Ever since Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. used "imperial presidency" as a book title, the term has become central to the debate about the balance of power in the U.S. government. Since the presidency of George W. Bush, when advocates of executive power such as Dick Cheney gained ascendancy, the argument has blazed hotter than ever. Many argue the Constitution itself is in grave danger. What is to be done? The answer, according to legal scholars Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, is nothing. In The Executive Unbound, they provide a bracing challenge to conventional wisdom, arguing that a strong presidency is inevitable in the modern world. Most scholars, they note, object to today's level of executive power because it varies so dramatically from the vision of the framers. But there is nothing in our system of checks and balances that intrinsically generates order or promotes positive arrangements. In fact, the greater complexity of the modern world produces a concentration of power, particularly in the White House. The authors chart the rise of executive authority straight through to the Obama presidency. Political, cultural and social restraints, they argue, have been more effective in preventing dictatorship than any law. The executive-centered state tends to generate political checks that substitute for the legal checks of the Madisonian constitution.

About the Author, Eric A. Posner

Eric A. Posner is Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School, and is the author of The Perils of Global Legalism, Terror in the Balance (written with Vermeule), and Climate Change Justice, among other books.

Adrian Vermeule is John H. Watson Jr. Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, and is the author of Law and the Limits of Reason, Mechanisms of Democracy, and Judging Under Uncertainty, and is the co-author with Posner of Terror in the Balance.

Reviews

There are no reviews yet. Log in to write one.

Editorials

Library Journal

Posner (Univ. of Chicago Law Sch.) and Vermeule (Harvard Law Sch.) have written a thought-provoking book on what they see as the failure of the U.S. Constitution's checks and balances. The authors argue that modern government and its complex system of increased executive power and powerful administrative agencies has made checks and balances useless. They follow the ideas of the German political theorist Carl Schmitt, who believed that democratic politics do not check the power of the administrative state. According to Schmitt, the executive of the administrative state is unconstrained by the legislative branch or by the courts. Posner and Vermeule expound on Schmitt's theory in six chapters on the various aspects of American government that have weakened checks and balances. Each chapter tackles a particular factor and is extremely detailed. The first chapter, for example, explores the role of crisis in expanding executive power. VERDICT This book thoroughly examines its subject but is not for the casual reader. Political science students interested in political theory will want to read this, and law students may also be interested.β€”Becky Kennedy, Atlanta-Fulton P.L., GA

Book Details

Published
April 1, 2013
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Pages
256
Format
Paperback
ISBN
9780199934034

More by Eric A. Posner

Similar books