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Synopsis
The purpose of the book is twofold: to give a theory of reference for the indexical `I' and to explain what is involved in thinking about oneself. The first part constitutes a critique of different solutions to the problem of how `I' refers, while the second part advances a positive account of `I' and I-thoughts. It is argued that `I' refers indirectly through a de re sense that is based on non-conceptual content. `I' expresses an individual concept with two components: a de re sense and a context-independent self-concept. Other issues that are discussed concern self-knowledge, e.g. whether there is something in specific that we have to know about ourselves to be able to self-refer, and the kind of self-consciousness that is required for self-reference. Furthermore, the notions of unity of consciousness and personal identity, as they both are presupposed by a competent use of `I', are examined.
Audience: The book is intended for philosophers of mind and language with a general interest in theories of reference and meaning, and more specifically in the first person, the self, and self-knowledge.
Booknews
Brinck (philosophy, Lund U., Sweden) presents a theory of reference for the indexical first person, and explains what is involved in thinking about oneself. She first critiques different solutions to the problem of how the primary pronoun refers, then advances a positive account of the self and thinking about it in which the I refers indirectly through a sense that is based on non-conceptual content. She argues that it expresses an individual concept comprised of a sense and a context-independent self-concept. Addressed to philosopher of mind and language. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.