Arab-Israeli Conflict, Peace Studies, Israel - Diplomatic Relations, Middle Eastern History - Modern - General & Miscellaneous, Treaties & Alliances - General & Miscellaneous

The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East

Name: The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East
Author: Uri Savir
ISBN: 9780679745617

by Uri Savir

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Overview

"Meet your Enemy Number One," a nervous Norwegian diplomat said to Uri Savir, the young director-general of Israel's Foreign Ministry, as he introduced him to Abu Ala, one of Yasser Arafat's top aides. They were in Oslo, and this was the first official encounter between Israel and the PLO. The atmosphere was tense. Savir read from prepared notes: "The aim of Israel's elected government," he began, "is to bring about a historic reconciliation with the Palestinian people. We have no interest in only a cosmetic change of the status quo. It is not our wish to control your lives. . . ."
          For more than half a century, both sides had denied the other's right to exist; both had sustained a terrible toll. Yet in the three years that followed that first encounter, after thousands of hours of subtle and complex secret negotiations, they hammered out the blueprint for a peaceful conclusion to a conflict that had seemed irre-
concilable. This book is the Israeli chief negotiator's extraordinary account of those negotiations, their implementation and aftermath, and of the un-
likely partnership that emerged between Yitz-
hak Rabin, Yasser Arafat, and Shimon Peres.
           As the process initiated at Oslo began to re-
shape allegiances throughout the Middle East, Israeli and Palestinian extremists set out to violently destroy what they described as "the threat of peace." This is the inside story of the race between those committed to reconciliation and those who vowed to destroy the peace. It is also a poignant story of the developing relationship between Savir and Abu Ala, both from Jeru-
salem, both committed to their people, to their land, and to peace.
            Will the peace process initiated at Oslo prevail against the assault of extremists and enemies of peace on both sides? The answer to this question, and the future of the peace process, is crucial not just to Israel and the Palestinians, but to the Middle East and the world.

From the Hardcover edition.

Synopsis

Publisher"s Weekly

"Savir, Israel's chief negotiator with the PLO from 1993 to 1996, resigned as director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry when Benjamin Netanyahu's right-wing coalition took power. His dramatic chronicle detailing three years of secret and semi-secret talks between Israel and the Palestinians -- mostly in Oslo, but also in Rome, Geneva, Cairo, Tunis -- is a remarkable piece of living history." -- Publisher's Weekly

About the Author, Uri Savir

Uri Savir was Israel's chief negotiator with the PLO from 1993 to 1996. He was the first Israeli official to negotiate secretly with a senior representative of the PLO. From their first meeting up until the signing of the Interim Agreement in September 1995, he and his Palestinian counterpart, Abu Ala, spent approximately thirty-five hundred hours in negotiations. In 1994-95, Savir headed Israel's delegation for talks with Syria and permanent status negotiations with the Palestinians. Savir has been an associate of Shimon Peres since 1984. He was Israel's consul general in New York between 1988 and 1992 and director-general of Israel's Foreign Ministry from 1993 to 1996. Today, he heads the newly founded Peres Center for Peace in Tel Aviv.

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Editorials

Publisher"s Weekly

Serge Schmemann

...Savir's book [is] critical for those -- in Israel and abroad -- who sincerely want to apprecieate the real requirements for peace and the real obstacles to it....Savir is a professional diplomat, striving on every page to be fair and factual, and keenly aware of the failings of the peace process... -- New York Times Book Review

Shimon Peres

"This is a brilliant book, written by a brilliant man.. Rarely will you find another individual such as Uri Savir, who combines a unique level of sophistication with an amazing sense of humor. As a writer, he excels in his ability to remain true to the facts and deal fairly with the cast of characters who participated in the making of this piece of history." -- Shimon Peres, former Prime Minister of Israel

Publishers Weekly

Savir, Israel's chief negotiator with the PLO from 1993 to 1996, resigned as director-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry when Benjamin Netanyahu's right-wing coalition took power. His dramatic chronicle detailing three years of secret and semi-secret talks between Israel and the Palestiniansmostly in Oslo, but also in Rome, Geneva, Cairo, Tunisis a remarkable piece of living history. As re-created here, the Oslo rounds, which led to the historic handshake between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO chief Yasser Arafat in 1993, were far more productive than the official talks in Washington. Savir accuses the Clinton administration of erring in placing little faith in the Oslo process, because it hoped, in vain as it turned out, for a breakthrough with Syria. Savir, who currently heads the Peres Center for Peace in Tel Aviv, credits Rabin, Shimon Peres and Arafat with taking bold, unpopular decisions in their determination to break a seemingly endless cycle of violence. He portrays the complex negotiations as a marathon chess game fraught with feints, brutal confrontations and mutual suspicion, yet at their infrequent best, the participants formed a problem-solving partnership pointing the way to future Arab-Israeli cooperation. (May)

Library Journal

The end of the Gulf War set in motion a series of events that had the potential to transform the Middle East. The most far-reaching of these developments dealt with negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The so-called Madrid track reflected the public side of such negotiations, while the secret Oslo track focused on more substantive issues. This book, written by Israel's chief negotiator at the Oslo talks (who was also Israel's consul general in New York, 1988-92), is a detailed account of some 3500 hours of negotiations between the two sides. The narrative is easy to follow as the author vividly describes the multitude of complicated issues in the negotiations. An important lesson learned is the pitfall of asymmetrical negotiations, where the weaker side eventually succumbs to the weight of its more powerful adversary. Recommended for academic and public libraries.Nader Entessar, Spring Hill Coll., Mobile, AL

Kirkus Reviews

A leading Israeli diplomat's insider view of the intricate negotiations between his country and the Palestinians from May 1993, four months before the conclusion of the Oslo agreement, through May 1996 and the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as prime minister. Savir, former Israeli consul-general in New York, became director general of his country's Foreign Ministry under the late Yitzhak Rabin. When it became apparent that the secret Oslo talks begun in early 1993 had a real potential for a diplomatic breakthrough, he was named head of the Jewish state's negotiations with the PLO, and then the Palestinian Authority, during the three-year period he chronicles. Norwegian mediators half-jokingly, half-seriously introduced his Palestinian counterpart, Abu Ala, to Savir as "your enemy number one." The two often conveyed sharply conflicting views and instructions from their superiors, yet not only learned how to work together but developed a deep respect, even fondness, for each other. Savir is most revealing in relating how fraught with basic national yearnings and symbolism even the most seemingly technical issues became. The Israelis were desperate for security and an end to terror, the Palestinians equally insistent on not being condescended to or humiliated by the Israelis, and upon a recognition of the trappings of a national identity. Savir also writes with an admirable capacity to criticize Israeli leaders in a thoughtful and restrained way. For example, concerning Israel's closure of the Gaza and West Bank borders and its concomitant focus on Arafat's inadequate efforts to combat Palestinian terrorists, he acknowledges that "we tended to be so focused on the Palestinian leadershipthat we often failed to see Palestinian society as a community of needs and aspirations that its leaders must serve and reflect." Passages like this will make Savir open to charges of not being a hard-headed enough diplomat and historian; others will rightfully praise him for possessing the skilled negotiator's necessary qualities of empathy, vision, and an ability to compromise.