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Overview
Based upon the author's own experiences this study explores the Israeli government's attitude to the West Bank and Gaza over a period of 30 years. The "fools" in the book's title refers not only to the Arabs who rejected Israeli peace offers but to the Israelis themselves.
Synopsis
A retired Israeli Major-General and the first Coordinator of Israeli Government operations in the Occupied Territories after the Six Day War reviews and criticizes Israeli policy towards the territories, arguing that Palestinian revolt against the occupation was inevitable, especially when the occupying power developed feelings of superiority and contempt towards its subjects. He also contends that Israel's inability to carry out its "initial intention of enacting an 'enlightened' and humane occupation" and the growth of corruption within the Israeli occupation government increased the speed with which the Palestinians would find the occupation intolerable. Translated from the Hebrew work Peta'im be-malkodet. Distributed in the US by ISBS. Annotation ©2004 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
Foreign Affairs
Gazit, the coordinator of Israeli government operations in the Occupied Territories from 1967 to 1974, was on the ground in the early years of the occupation and has closely followed developments since. He begins his candid account with short chapters on how each successive Israeli minister of defense has approached the territories, beginning with Moshe Dayan and continuing to the outbreak of the first Palestinian intifada in 1987. Later chapters examine military administration, plans for Palestinian self-rule (including the ill-fated "village leagues"), and the evolution of Israeli settlement policy. Until the outbreak of the intifada in 1987, Gazit notes, the occupation seemed so trouble-free as to cause complacency; since then, violence has taken a toll on both sides. As his title indicates, Gazit sees the decades-long military occupation as a terrible blunder, but his is not a thesis-driven account. Indeed, the strength of Trapped Fools is its balanced description of Israeli policies and performance in the Occupied Territories from 1967 to 1997.