Engineering - General & Miscellaneous, Games, Theories of Science, Mathematics, Mathematics, Mathematical Modeling, Economics - Mathematical & Quanitative Methods, Engineering - General & Miscellaneous
Available on Bookshop
Write a review
Books.org participates in affiliate programs including Bookshop.org and the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program. We may earn a commission from qualifying purchases made through links on this page, at no additional cost to you.
Log in to track your reading progress.
Overview
This book takes three different approaches to the two-person bargaining problem with incomplete information: The game theoretic analysis, the study of the spontaneous behavior of subjects in a game playing experiment, and the investigation of strategies programmed by highly experienced subjects in a strategy experiment. The two different experimental approaches allow to study the bargaining behavior which emerges spontaneously in interactive plays of two subjects, and moreover the instructions experienced subjects give to a representative. The three approaches together provide a vivid picture of theoretical and experimentally observed behavior in the two-person bargaining problem. The synopsis of these different approaches is a novelty in the analysis of boundedly rational behavior.Book Details
Published
June 28, 1994
Publisher
Springer-Verlag New York, LLC
Pages
302
Format
Paperback
ISBN
9783540579205