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Overview
This book brings together a collection of papers by leading academics, bankers, and consultants, in a masterful survey of leading issues in corporate governance. The papers concentrate upon the financing of corporations, and the role of the banks and stock markets in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. A central theme of the book is a constant awareness of the links between the accountability of senior managers, the system of corporate governance, and the performance of a company. This book examines the role of shareholders, company boards, and managers under a market-based system as in the UK and USA, in comparison with the 'insider' system found in Japan and, to a lesser extent, Germany. The contributors discuss the view that this UK system leads to a preoccupation with short-term corporate performance and a greater likelihood of hostile takeovers. The contribution of the banks to corporate finance and control is examined in several papers, including a discussion of the special problems of small firms. Part II of the book begins with a chapter comparing and contrasting the British experience with other systems, and then authoritatively analyses the Japanese and the German financial and corporate systems. Capital Markets and Corporate Governance provides an essential insight into issues of corporate financing, accountability of managers, and efficiency. The contributors deal with this complex and topical subject in a comprehensive and lucid manner.Synopsis
The debate over corporate governance, or how companies are controlled, has flourished vigorously for several years in the U.S. and has now spread to the U.K. This book collects papers by leading academics, bankers, and consultants which discuss major issues in corporate governance in the U.K., Germany, and Japan. It examines the role of shareholders, company boards, and managers under a market-based system as exists in the U.K. and the U.S. in comparison with the insider system found in Japan and, to a lesser extent, Germany. The issue of the effectiveness of the British system and how it might be made more efficient through increasing the accountability of company boards to shareholders, both directly and via the capital market, is extensively discussed.