Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis

This is the first study to examine throughly the role of US, Soviet and Cuban Intelligence in the nuclear crisis of 1962 - the closest the world has come to Armageddon.

Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis examines for the first time the role and performance of all three intelligence communities centrally involved in this seminal event: American, Soviet and Cuban. The ways in which organizational and personality variables affect the political exploitation of intelligence is assessed followed by an analysis of the psychology of intelligence assessment, showing how common cognitive and motivational pathologies can explain crucial errors of inference and attribution made by all three intelligence communities. In closing, the lessons of the volume as a whole are reflected upon for the theory and practice of intelligence assessment, and for our understanding of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

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A collection of essays that examine the role and performance of American, Soviet, and Cuban intelligence communities in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Some of the contributing authors are scholars, while others offer insights based on their practical experiences as professional intelligence analysts during the crisis. The editors' introduction places the study in historical context. Three essays offer an empirical examination of the roles, activities, and assessments of the American, Soviet, and Cuban intelligence communications, focusing on the interplay between intelligence professionals and policy makers. The following two analytical essays concentrate on the organization and politics of intelligence, and on the cognitive and motivational explanations of Reagan's shift in Soviet policy. The editors' closing essay reflects on the implication of the foregoing essays, on evaluating intelligence performance, and on the theory and practice of intelligence assessment. Distributed by ISBS. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.