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Overview
This book is at odds with the presuppositions behind a received view on law as a systematic solution to social problems in the name of justice. It argues that neither do facts in law represent social reality, nor do norms represent a moral ideal. Representationalism as such, in its various legal guises, is put to the test of what is called here 'the interception hypothesis'. Although it is derived from the theory of literature (the theory of narrative) and corroborated by several close reading analyses of legal texts (both decisions and statutory rules), this hypothesis aims, in the first part, at providing an alternative model for the structure and the value of legal knowledge. The second part shows how this knowledge is operative in fundamental concepts like democracy, punishment and (contractual) obligation.
Synopsis
This book is at odds with the presuppositions behind a received view on law as a systematic solution to social problems in the name of justice. It argues that neither do facts in law represent social reality, nor do norms represent a moral ideal. Representationalism as such, in its various legal guises, is put to the test of what is called here `the interception hypothesis'. Although it is derived from the theory of literature (the theory of narrative) and corroborated by several close reading analyses of legal texts (both decisions and statutory rules), this hypothesis aims, in the first part, at providing an alternative model for the structure and the value of legal knowledge. The second part shows how this knowledge is operative in fundamental concepts like democracy, punishment and (contractual) obligation.
Booknews
Challenges the view of law as a systematic solution to social problems in the name of justice, arguing that facts in law do not represent social reality, nor norms represent a moral ideal. Brings Representationalism itself, in its various legal guises, before the judgement of the Interception Hypothesis, which Roermund derived from the theory of literature and corroborated by several close-reading analyses of texts of legal decisions and statutory rules. The hypothesis seeks to provide an alternative model for the structure and value of legal knowledge and to show how this knowledge is operative in fundamental concepts like democracy, punishment, and contractual obligations. Revised and translated from the Dutch published by Coutinho in 1993, itself a collection of nine essays revised from previous publication. No index. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.