Limits Of Persuasion

This book provides both a unique, first-hand account of German and European diplomacy in the early stages of the Yugoslav crisis and a detailed analysis of the major issues. By correcting the many misperceptions and misjudgments about that period, the book will put the debate on Western involvement in the former Yugoslavia on a new and more solid basis.

This book presents both a detailed historical account of German diplomacy in the first year of the Yugoslav crisis and a thorough analysis of the issues that Germany and the international community faced at the time. Written by the German diplomat responsible for the conduct of German policy on the working level, the book is a compelling, first-hand view of the motives, perceptions, and actions of the German government.

Part I is a chronological treatment of the responses of the European Community and of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to developments on the ground—in particular, the military conflict in Croatia and the German role in shaping these responses. Part II provides a systematic treatment of the causes of the conflict and the major issues raised by the Yugoslav crisis, such as questions concerning self-determination, frontiers, the role of history, and the recognition of successor states. Taken together, the two parts provide a comprehensive analysis of the origins of international involvement in the Bosnian war. This book will interest scholars, researchers, and policymakers involved with the Bosnian conflict and contemporary German and international relations.

This unique, first-hand account of German and European diplomacy in the early stages of the Yugoslav crisis is also a detailed analysis of the major issues that confronted decision-makers at that time.

Booknews

Examines Germany's role in the Yugoslav crisis during the years 1991- 1992, by a diplomat who was head of the Southeast European Department of the German Foreign Ministry from 1991 to 1995. Part I is a narrative of German, EC, and CSCE diplomacy between June 1991 and August 1992, against the background of events in Yugoslavia. Part II analyzes issues faced by German diplomacy, and Part III draws conclusions about the merits and weaknesses of German policy on Yugoslavia. This is not an officially sanctioned account, and it does not reveal details about policies of other countries that have not yet been made public. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.

MICHAEL LIBAL is Ambassador, Head of the Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to Georgia.